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Police Liability for False Arrest or Imprisonment
John M. Manos*
F INDEED, THE POLICEMAN'S LOT is not a happy one,1 it is certainly be-
coming a most sophisticated and complicated one. With swirling cur-
rents of thought eddying through the United States Supreme Court, re-
sulting in the overthrow of long-established constitutional standards, the
consequent code of conduct for the policeman has changed radically. The
newly expanded duty to recognize and to respect a full panorama of con-
stitutional rights of an accused has excited much comment, favorable and
critical. But of much more personal concern to the individual policeman
is the potential liability he may face in an action for damages, particu-
larly for false imprisonment. This liability may spring from the ancient
common law concept of false imprisonment or, its sister action, malicious
prosecution, or from the relatively recent Civil Rights Statutes.2
False imprisonment has been defined by the Ohio Supreme Court as
"an unlawful detention or illegal deprivation of one's liberty." 3 Thus,
the word "false" is synonymous with "unlawful." The following is a
complete definition of false imprisonment as defined by the American
Law Institute: I
An act which, directly or indirectly, is a legal cause of a confinement
of another within boundaries fixed by the actor for any time, no mat-
ter how short in duration, makes the actor liable to the other irre-
spective of whether harm is caused to any legally protected interest
of the other, if the act is intended so to confine the other or a third
person, and the other is conscious of the confinement, and the con-
finement is not consented to by the other, and the confinement is not
otherwise privileged. 5
It is difficult to arrive at a valid distinction between false arrest
and false imprisonment. The two causes of action are practically indis-
tinguishable. When there is a false arrest there is a false imprisonment,
but in a false arrest detention is based on asserted legal authority to en-
force the processes of the law. A false imprisonment can arise between
private persons for a private end with no relevance to the administration
of criminal law. Our primary concern here, of course, is solely with a
detention under color of -law. This article purports to describe the var-
*Judge, Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio.
Gilbert & Sullivan, The Pirates of Penzance.
2 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964).
3 Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918).
4 Cf., also, Prosser, Torts 55 (3d ed. 1964).
5 1 Restatement, Torts, 66 § 35 (1934).
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ious situations in which an officer of the law6 can expose himself to
liability for false imprisonment.
7
An oral declaration of an arrest is not necessary in order to consti-
tute an imprisonment. If the person arrested understands that he is un-
der restraint by an officer and submits to this restraint, then he is im-
prisoned. Conversely, an oral declaration of an arrest with a submission
to such restraint constitutes a false imprisonment. The Court in Johnson
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. stated as follows:
Any exercise of force, or express or implied threat of force, by
which in fact any person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to re-
main where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not
wish to go, is an imprisonment. So if an officer tells a person that he
is under arrest, and he thereupon submits himself to the officer, go-
ing with him and obeying his orders, such person is deprived of his
liberty, and if the act of the officer is unlawful it is false imprison-
ment.8
Actual malice is not a necessary element to recover for a false im-
prisonment.9 In Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated as follows:
False imprisonment per se is not concerned with good or bad
faith, malicious motive, or want of probable cause on the part of the
prosecuting witness, or the officer causing the imprisonment.'"
Good faith on the part of an officer will not justify an illegal arrest. 1
The courts apply this strict rule in order to protect the public from illegal
activity. Recognizing the fact that hardships will arise in some situations,
the harshness of this rule has been softened by permitting evidence of
good faith to be shown in mitigation of punitive damages.' 2
In further defining false imprisonment and false arrest it is neces-
6 In referring to policemen in this article it is intended to include within that scope
any law enforcement officer. The term is used here in its inartful lay sense, that is,
a general reference to any organized civil force for maintaining law and order and
preventing and detecting crime.
7 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 54-55, "'Imprisonment,' while it seems originally to
have meant stone walls and iron bars, no longer signifies incarceration; the plaintiff
may be imprisoned when his movements are restrained in the open street, or in a
traveling automobile, or when he is confined to an entire city, or is compelled to go
along with the defendant. The older idea of confinement has persisted, however, in
the requirement that the restraint be a total one, rather than a mere obstruction of
the right to go where the plaintiff pleases. Thus it is not imprisonment to block the
plaintiff's passage in one direction only, or to shut him in a room with a reasonable
exit open. But it seems clear that too much emphasis hs been placed upon the tech-
nical name of the tort; such interferences may invade a right which is entitled to
protection, and an action may lie for them, though it is not that of false imprison-
ment. If there is any distinction, it is that false imprisonment, being derived from
the action of trespass, may be maintained without proof of actual damage, while in
such other actions, proof of some damage may be required."
8 82 W.Va.692, 97 S.E. 189, 191 (1918).
9 Reilly v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 15 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1926).
10 Supra n. 3.
11 Nelson v. Kellogg, 162 Cal. 621, 123 P. 1115 (1912).
12 Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1879).
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FALSE ARREST
sary to point out that a police officer may be liable even though the
criminal charge may be truthful. If a warrant is defective for failure to
state an offense, the police officer may be liable even though the plaintiff
is found guilty of a criminal charge arising out of the false arrest. An
action based on false arrest relates to the violation of a police officer's
authority and not the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff. A police officer
cannot justify a false arrest for one offense by showing that the plaintiff
is guilty of some other offense or the plaintiff could have been arrested
for some other offense properly.13
Our first pursuit is to distinguish between false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution. In Stork v. Evert, the court, risking over-simpli-
fication, stated that:
The real difference between the two causes of action is that in mali-
cious prosecution the wrong is malicious, but under due form of law,
whereas in an action for false imprisonment the detention is without
any legal authority.14
This statement is predicated upon the Ohio Supreme Court's consider-
ation of the problem in Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh,15 wherein a game
warden was sued for false imprisonment by an errant fisherman who
claimed that his arrest by the warden was effected through an invalid
warrant. The court found that the arrest warrant which the warden had
served was prima facie regular in that jurisdiction and was properly
posited in the issuing magistrate, and that the recitals did state an of-
fense. The question then to be answered was whether the officer was
exposed to suit if it later be found that the warrant was defective. The
court stated:
Whether or not the complaint is true or false is of no concern in an
action for false imprisonment. Such inquiry may be essential to an
action in malicious prosecution. Whether or not the complaint in the
form of affidavit, information or indictment is or is not sufficient in
law to charge an offense is likewise per se insufficient to furnish the
basis of an action in false imprisonment.
The law relating to false imprisonment classifies affidavits, informa-
tions and indictments into "void" and "voidable." The "void" class
includes those setting forth facts which in no conceivable form can
constitute a criminal offense; or if they might constitute an offense,
the court issuing the process had no jurisdiction over such offense
or the person charged with the offense. The "voidable" class includes
those where a bona fide attempt has been made to charge a possible
offense under the statute, but by reason of some defect or irregular-
ity such charge is per se insufficient in law. As to such "voidable"
complaint, or "voidable" processes issued thereon there can be no
false imprisonment per se.
13 Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, supra n. 3; Noe v. Meadows, 229 Ky. 53, 16 S.W.2d
505 (1929).
14 47 Ohio App. 256, 258, 191 N.E. 794 (1934).
15 Supra n. 3.
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It is important to note, as pointed out in Brinkman, that the tort of
false imprisonment is not dependent upon the mental attitude of the
alleged tortfeasor. False imprisonment is, in a sense, a clean-cut concept:
If the process is void, the arrest is illegal and liability ensues; if the
process is merely voidable no liability attaches. Thus, in Click v. Parish,,
the officer was accused of conspiring to secure the plaintiff's arrest as a
pretext to collect a private debt owed to a third party. The court, re-
versing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, reviewed the Supreme Court
holding in Brinkman, and found that the plaintiff had failed to state a
cause of action because the affidavit and warrant for his arrest were reg-
ular on their face. Discussing "void" as opposed to "voidable" warrants,
the court stated:
Under the rules mentioned, the "void" class includes affidavits,
informations and indictments setting forth facts which in no conceiv-
able form can constitute a criminal offense; or if they might consti-
tute an offense, the court issuing the process had no jurisdiction over
such offense or the person charged with the offense. And the "void-
able" class includes those affidavits, informations and indictments
where a bona fide attempt has been made to charge a possible
offense under the statute, but by reason of some defect or irregular-
ity such charge is per se insufficient in law.'
7
Liability of an Officer for a Mistake in Executing Valid Arrest Warrant.
The mere fact, however, that an arresting officer is executing a
prima facie valid arrest warrant does not totally immunize him against
an action for false imprisonment.
When an officer executes a valid warrant but mistakenly arrests the
wrong person, we are again confronted with another seemingly irrecon-
cilable collision between individual liberty and effective law enforcement.
The constitutional right of individuals to be free from unlawful restraint
must be measured with the practical exigencies confronting police offi-
cers. If the officer is to be protected absolutely when making an arrest,
cases may arise in which an innocent person will be deprived of his lib-
erty and have no effective remedy for the wrong suffered. If, however,
the officer is held to act at his peril, the administration of the law through
the execution of warrants is surely to be impeded, and criminals may
escape arrest because of the timidity and caution exercised by the offi-
cers.'
8
In response to this dilemma, two divergent views came into focus.
The majority view is that an officer who arrests the wrong person is
liable only if he failed to use reasonable care in determining the identity
of the person named in the warrant. An arrest by an officer is privileged
16 89 OhioApp. 318, 98 N.E.2d 333 (1950), aff'd 155 Ohio St. 84, 98 N.E.2d 293 (1951).
17 Supra n. 3 at 177, 178.
18 Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 54 S.E. 1022 (1906).
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where the officer in good faith believes that the one arrested is in fact
the one intended to be arrested.
Still a further solution-a compromise between the two judicial
views-has recently been urged by the American Law Institute. In the
revised Statement of Torts, the advisory board suggests:
An arrest under a warrant is not privileged unless the person
arrested
(a) is a person sufficiently named or otherwise described in the
warrant and is, or is reasonably believed by the actor to be, the per-
son intended, or
(b) although not such person, has knowingly caused the actor
to believe him to be so. 19
As pointed out in the editorial comments, 20 the officer's diligence does not
insulate him from legal attack unless an affirmative action by the ar-
restee has induced the officer's mistake. This view would draw support
from obiter dicta in Stork v. Evert,1 where the arresting officer's mis-
take was prompted by the plaintiff-arrestee's misleading actions.
The rule governing mistaken identity in Ohio, however, is clearly set
forth in Johnson v. Reddy,2 2 a classic case of understandable error. The
Cleveland Police Department had received information from the Penn-
sylvania State Police that the plaintiff-arrestee was wanted in Pennsyl-
vania. The plaintiff's name, address, and general description were fur-
nished. After checking these, the Cleveland police arrested the suspect
so described. In overturning a verdict against the arresting officers, the
Ohio Supreme Court, speaking through its syllabus, held:
3. Where request for investigation of a person is made to a
police agency of this state by a recognized police agency of another
state identifying the subject by address and name and giving a
physical description not materially varying from the actual physical
appearance of the subject and following a report of such investiga-
tion, the foreign agency requests the arrest of the subject, an officer
making the arrest without any warrant does so upon reasonable in-
formation and is not thereby subject to liability for false arrest or
imprisonment.
Thus, the court held, as a matter of law, that the defendants were en-
titled to rely upon information furnished by another law enforcement
agency so long as their reliance was reasonable.
19 2 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 125 (1965).
20 "If the actor arrests another who is not sufficiently named or otherwise de-
scribed, mistaking him for a third person who is sufficiently named or otherwise
described in the warrant, and who is understood by the actor to be intended by the
name or description, the arrest is not privileged, no matter how reasonable the
mistake of identity may be, unless as stated in Clause (b), the other knowingly
causes the mistake."
21 47 OhioApp. 256, 191 N.E. 794 (1934).
22 163 Ohio St. 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955).
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In other cases involving an identity or similarity in name between
the person sought and the one mistakenly apprehended, officers have
generally prevailed.23 It should follow, therefore, that when the arrested
person's name varies materially from the one named in the warrant, the
arresting officer should not be absolved from responsibility as to his act
or conduct.
24
Civil Liability for Improper Arrest of Suspected Felon Without Warrant
The comon law devised a myriad of rules to govern the right of
peace officers and private citizens to arrest a suspected lawbreaker. The
general rule is stated by Prosser: 25
The common law distinguishes between the authority of a peace
officer and that of a private person, and makes further distinctions
according to the nature of the crime for which arrest is made.
a. Either an officer or a private person may arrest for a felony or
a breach of the peace committed in his presence, or to prevent
the immediate commission of such a crime.
b. An officer may arrest if he has reasonable grounds for suspicion,
based on information as to the facts, that a felony has been com-
mitted by the person arrested.
c. A private person may arrest if a felony has in fact been commit-
ted, and he has reasonable grounds to suspect the person arrested.
It is proper for a peace officer to effect an arrest in order to prevent
the commission of a crime 26 or when he has reason to believe that a
crime is about to be committed. The term "in his presence" has been
duly construed to include any sensory perceptions. 27 The law only re-
quires that the officer be aware of the commission of the crime.
The civil liability of a police officer for arresting without a warrant
in Ohio is stated in Ryan v. Conover,28 wherein the plaintiff had been
arrested by the defendant officer for violations of the traffic law. Plain-
23 Johnson v. Enlow, 286 P.2d 630 (Col. 1955); Walton v. Will, 66 Cal.App.2d 509,
152 P.2d 639 (1944); Schneider v. Kessler, 97 P.2d 542 (3rd Cir. 1938). Accord:
Massey Stores, Inc. v. Reeves, 111 Ga.App. 227, 141 S.E.2d 227 (1965); King v. Rob-
ertson, 227 Ala. 378, 150 So. 154 (1933).
24 Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So.2d 699 (1944).
25 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 108.
26 Handcock v. Baker, 2 Bos. & P. 260, 120 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800) (murder about to
be committed); Hayes v. Mitchell, 80 Ala. 183 (1881) (breach of peace about to
occur); State v. Hughlette, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841 (1923) (reasonable belief felony
being committed).
27 It is sufficient if the crime is perceived by sight, Robertson v. Commonwealth, 198
Ky. 699, 249 SW. 1010 (1923); People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S. 326 (S. Ct.
1922); hearing, State v. Blackwelder, 182 N.C. 899, 109 S.E. 644 (1921); smell, United
States v. Fischer, 38 F.2d 830 (M.D. Pa. 1930); mechanical devices, United States v.
Harnish, 7 F.Supp. 305 (N.D. Me. 1934); or a confession, State v. Gulczynsky, 2 W.W.
Harr. 120, 120 A. 88 (1922).
28 59 OhioApp. 361, 18 N.E.2d 277 (1937).
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tiff, although he pleaded guilty immediately after his arrest to the
offenses with which he was charged, subsequently sued the policeman
and alleged that the policeman maliciously and without cause filed an
affidavit and arrested the plaintiff. The court held:
An officer may arrest a person when circumstances exist that
would cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been
committed in his presence. Section 13432-1, General Code; Bock v.
City of Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 183 N.E. 119; 6 Corpus Juris,
Secundum, 595; 3 Ohio Jurisprudence, 140, Section 11. And this is
true even though no offense has actually been committed. Conse-
quently no civil liability attaches to him on account thereof in either
circumstance. 3 Ohio Jurisprudence 176, Section 41. And in order
to make the arrest he may pursue the person into any part of the
state....
In the case at bar it is clear from plaintiff's opening statement
that at least two of the offenses were committed in the presence of
the officer, and he was, therefore, authorized in arresting, if the ap-
pearance would have caused a reasonable person to so act.29
Thus, in Ohio, an officer acting upon proper cause is insulated from
liability. There is authority contraY0 The position maintained by Prosser
apparently stems from the traditional origin of the tort of false imprison-
ment. At common law it sounded in trespass, as opposed to trespass on
the case, so that the liability would be strict for improper arrest regard-
less of the fact that the mistake was excusable. Whatever departure
Ohio law may take from common law is apparently authorized by Ohio
Revised Code Section 2935.04,31 which permits arrest without warrant
upon a showing of a reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been
committed and that the person arrested is guilty of the offense.
Detention Without Warrant of a Mentally Deranged Person
Another potential source of liability for the working policeman is
the detention of one who is mentally deranged or appears to be. The
general rule at common law is as follows: 32
The long-established common-law rule is that a person actually
insane may be arrested and detained by any interested party, with-
out a warrant or legal process first issuing in a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding to have the person declared a lunatic or confined
29 Id. at 364.
30 Cf., Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 52.
31 "When a felony has been committed, or there is reasonable ground to believe
that a felony has been committed, any person without a warrant may arrest another
whom he has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of the offense, and detain him
until a warrant can be obtained."
32 Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 570, 572 (1963); Cf., also, Porter v. Rich, 70 Conn. 235, 39 A.
169 (1898); Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305, 151 N.E. 911 (1926); Bisgaard v. Duvall,
169 Iowa 711, 151 N.W. 1051 (1915); Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 302, 87 A.2d 115
(1952); Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90 (1879); Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395,
79 N.E.2d 459 (1947).
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as an insane person, when an arrest is necessary to prevent imme-
diate bodily injury to the arrestee or another. As usually expressed,
the common-law emphasizes the elements of (1) actual insanity, (2)
urgency, and (3) necessity.
Thus, in Bisgaard v. Duvall,33 the court stated:
It is well established that an insane person, without any adjudi-
cation, may lawfully be restrained of his liberty for his own benefit,
either because it is necessary to protect him against a tendency to
suicide, or to stray away from those who would care for him, or to
protect others from his assaults, or other depredations, or because
proper medical treatment requires it.... Of course, all such arrests
or restraints must be reasonable and in good faith; and instructions
as to such restraints should be carefully guarded. . . . An insane
person stands upon a different plane from that of a criminal; and for
his own good, as well as for the protection of the community, he may
often be restrained by any person, especially by anyone having an
interest in him, or by one whose safety may depend upon his deten-
tion, and he may be taken in charge without a warrant. The re-
straint of an insane person or of a person claimed to be insane is not
designed as a punishment for an act done....
In the application of this rule, however, there is some cause for con-
cern. The first requisite for arrest without warrant is actual insanity;
what consequences befall the officer if the apparently deranged person
proves to be sane? The majority view would affix liability upon him.
This harsh rule generates from Van Deusen v. Newcomer,34 wherein it
was held:
Whoever takes into his own hands so serious a responsibility as
the confinement of a citizen upon his own judgment merely, assum-
ing it to be necessary in self-defense, must show that, upon the evi-
dence, danger from his being at large was not merely possible, but
was probable. Many sane persons, under the influence of strong ex-
citements are subject to serious and perhaps dangerous fits of pas-
sion; but another could not be allowed, on this ground alone, to seize
and imprison them, in anticipation that possibly the occasion for ex-
citement might arise and the passion be manifested. ...
I concede that the right to restrain these unfortunate persons
for their own benefit or for the protection of others is as clear as the
right to restrain one who in the delirium of fever would break away
from his attendants, or one who, with a contagious disease upon him,
should attempt to enter a public assembly. But the first thing to be
determined is whether there is insanity in fact. (Emphasis added).
In Maxwell v. Maxwell,35 the court flatly rejected the contention
that the arrestor should not be liable if he had probable cause to believe
the plaintiff'to be insane:
33 169 Iowa 711, 151 N.W. 1051 (1915).
34 40 Mich. 90 (1879).
35 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920).
Sept., 1967
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss3/4
FALSE ARREST
It is not sufficient to show that he was lacking in mental capacity
or had hallucinations, but it must go further and show that to permit
him to go unrestrained imperiled his own safety or the safety of the
public. It is not sufficient to show in cases of this kind that he had
probable grounds for suspecting he was insane or probable reason
for believing that his being at large would imperil the safety of the
public. He must justify it by proving the fact upon which his right
to restrain rested....
One who arrests another and restrains him of his liberty, on the
theory that he is incapable of rational self-control, assumes the bur-
den of showing that fact and the imminent necessity for the restraint.
This, we think, is the true rule, and the sane and safe rule in matters
of this kind.
In Witte v. Haben,:" the court recognized the vicissitudes of this
rule, and nevertheless clung to it:
There is force in the position that it is a harsh rule to hold a
police officer for false imprisonment when the conduct of the one im-
prisoned has been such that the ordinarily prudent officer upon the
information obtained would come to the conclusion that he was in-
sane and ought to be detained. But, on the other hand, it is readily
seen to what oppression and harm a rule -would lend itself under
which a citizen may be deprived of his liberty without right and
without redress because, at some time or other, he has exhibited
certain peculiarities or abnormal traits which, through malice or
otherwise, come to the ears of an officer who, in good faith, arrests
upon the report .... But, as indicated, under our statutes and, we
believe, under the common law, the rule is that in an action against
an officer for false arrest and imprisonment the officer cannot justify
upon the ground that he made the arrest upon reliable information
that the person arrested was insane; that he fully believed this to be
a fact, and as a reasonably prudent officer was justified in so believ-
ing. If he without a warrant arrests a person on the ground and be-
lief that such person is insane, proof of insanity is the only defense
in a suit for unlawful imprisonment....
On the other hand, reason prevailed in Christiansen v. Weston,
37
wherein the court fashioned a rule of reasonable belief of insanity rather
than actual insanity:
We hold, therefore, that where an officer arrests a person on
suspicion of insanity, without first filing complaint and obtaining
order of court for the arrest, in an action of false imprisonment, he
can justify only by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
he had reasonable ground to believe, and did believe at the time, not
36 131 Minn. 71, 154 N.W. 662, 663-4 (1915). Cf., also: Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235,
39 A. 176, 177 (1898), wherein it was said: "But a private person can act only ...
at his peril,-the peril of being unable to prove the existence of the emergency
which is his justification .. "; and, Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 302, 87 A.2d 115, 120
(1952), where the court, by way of dictum, stated: "This right to make such con-
finement without legal process was dependent upon the fact of actual insanity of
such a nature that the person confined was actually a menace either to his own
safety or that of others."
37 36 Ariz. 200, 284 P. 149 (1930).
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only that defendant [sic] was insane, but that he was in such a con-
dition it would not be safe to delay his arrest until proper process
could be obtained.
The most cogent analysis and discussion of this subject appears in
Plancich v. Williamson,3 8 where the Supreme Court of Washington re-
versed a verdict against two arresting officers. The court phrased the
question before it as follows:
In resolving the question as to probable cause, we must view
the facts in retrospect-as of the time the incidents occurred leading
up to and including the arrest. The questions are not: (1) What,
actually, in fact had the respondent done on the evening in question
respecting his father? or, (2) What, actually, in fact was the re-
spondent's mental condition at the time of arrest? Rather, the ques-
tions are: (a) What did the appellants have reason to believe the
respondent had done? and, (b) What did they have reason to be-
lieve as to his mental condition? 39
The court stated that the arrest of the suspected mental case "could and
probably should have been handled differently," but the question to an-
swer was not, "What could better have been done, but whether what was
done was unreasonable." The following excerpt is proximate to this dis-
cussion:
While it may be expected that policemen act as supermen, they are
not employed and often are not trained or paid on this basis. Fur-
thermore, they live, work, and operate in a practical world, peopled
by individuals of all kinds and varieties, intellectually, emotionally,
and otherwise. It is simply too much to expect them to be endowed
with clairvoyant powers or the wisdom of philosophers sufficiently
to evaluate promptly on the firing line in terms of absolute truth and
accuracy factual situations comparable to that in the instant case.
Analysis in retrospect, with time for philosophic deliberation, can,
of course, more closely approximate the accuracy or ultimate truth
of laboratory or other scientific techniques.40
The court then overturned the verdict against the officers because there
was a reasonable basis for their actions.
It is submitted that the latter rule carries the greater weight. The
older cases imposing strict liability upon policemen-no matter how rea-
sonable their actions-are anachronistic relics of more sedate times. In
the lightning pace of today, policemen are constantly required to make
instantaneous decisions, some involving life and death. Under such
stress, we should only require that they act reasonably. The dangers to
which they are exposed ought not to be compounded by exposure to
liability for conduct which fully comports with reason.
38 57 Wash.2d 367, 357 P.2d 693 (1961).
39 Id. at 696.
40 Id. at 697.
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Liability for Illegal Detention After Arrest
One making an arrest may be liable for false imprisonment for the
failure to take the arrested person before a court or magistrate within
a reasonable time and/or without unnecessary delay.41 In Leger v. War-
ren,42 the court upheld a charge which in effect said:
* . .that though the defendants making the arrest or causing it to be
made, had good cause therefor, that did not justify the imprisonment
of the plaintiff thereunder for a longer period than was reasonably
necessary to enable the defendants to obtain a warrant or authority
from some competent tribunal for his further detention; and that his
continued imprisonment, without such warrant or authority, ren-
dered them liable as wrongdoers from the beginning, leaving only
the question of damages for the consideration of the jury.
The court premised its holding on this policy consideration. 43
The right to make arrests without a warrant is conferred by the
statute in order to prevent the escape of criminals where that is like-
ly to result from delay in procuring a writ for their apprehension;
and it was not the purpose to dispense with the necessity of obtain-
ing such writ as soon as the situation will reasonably permit. To
afford protection to the officer or person making the arrest, the au-
thority must be strictly pursued; and no unreasonable delay in pro-
curing a proper warrant for the prisoner's detention can be excused
or tolerated. Any other rule would leave the power open to great
abuse and oppression.
The fact that the arresting officer is pursuing his superior's orders
does not excuse him from liability for an unnecessarily delayed deten-
tion.44
There is a division of authority as to the responsibility of the arrest-
ing officer after he delivers the arrestee to the custody of another. Leger
v. Warren45 imposes continuing responsibility on arresting officer. But,
in Lemel v. Smith,4" it was held that when the arresting officers turned
41 Thurston v. Leno, 124 Vt. 298, 204 A.2d 106 (1964); Harness v. Steele, 159 nd. 286,
64 N.E. 875 (1902); Fulford v. O'Connor, 3 Ill.2d 490, 121 N.E.2d 767 (1954); Librach
v. Litzinger, 401 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1966).
42 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N.E. 506 (1900).
43 Id. at 508-9.
44 Leger v. Warren, supra n. 42; Moran v. Beckley, 67 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1933), citing
25 C.J. 493. There is authority for drawing a distinction between the responsibilty of
one who apprehends a suspected felon and one who apprehends a suspected mis-
demeanant. In Therriault v. Breton, 114 Me. 137, 95 A. 699 (1915), the court said
that it would be the duty of officers who arrested for a misdemeanor to procure a
warrant within reasonable time and take the person before a court; the court
further held that where an officer properly arrested a person suspected of a felony
that he could hold the person for a reasonable time to permit investigation of the
case before bringing him before a court. This is inconsistent with majority view
which follows the expression of the Ohio Supreme Court in Leger v. Warren, supra,
that, regardless of the nature of the offense charged the suspect is entitled to ju-
dicial scrutiny of his detention.
45 Supra n. 42.
46 64 Nev. 545, 187 P.2d 169 (1947).
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a suspect over to the desk sergeant at the city jail, whose duty it then
became to take the suspect before a magistrate, the arresting officers were
relieved. Similarly, in Kalish v. White,4 7 the arresting officer delivered
the suspect to his superior officer and was thereafter relieved of liability.
In Alvarez v. Reynolds, 48 where the arresting officers were patrolmen
who turned plaintiff over to investigating detectives, it was held that the
duties of the arresting officers ceased at that point so that they would
not be liable for a subsequent unlawful detention.
Damages
The question of determining damages in a false arrest case is most
important in determining whether or not to file a suit. There are ob-
viously many situations where there may be a technical false arrest but
unless some type of damages can be proved it would be a futile act to file
a suit. The general and broad rule in substance is that one causing a
wrongful imprisonment is liable for all natural and probable conse-
quences thereof.49
As in a personal tort action, the plaintiff is entitled to recover such
a sum as will fairly and justly compensate him for the injuries sustained.
Exemplary or punitive damages can also be recovered in an action for
false imprisonment. It seems that even the mere unlawful detention of
another constitutes a basis for recovery of nominal damages. 50 Obviously
you can recover more than nominal damages if you can prove an actual
loss of some kind. Examples of the kinds of injuries which would result
in false imprisonment are as follows, to-wit: physical suffering while in-
carcerated, mental suffering while incarcerated, humiliation, interruption
of business, and injury to reputation. Some jurisdictions follow the gen-
eral rule that recovery cannot be had for mental suffering unless there
is also some physical injury. Other jurisdictions permit recovery from
mental suffering standing alone if the elements of wilfulness or wanton-
ness are present.51
As stated before, punitive or exemplary damages are recoverable in
an action for false imprisonment. If the arrest or imprisonment is wilful
or malicious with the design to injure the plaintiff then the jury can go
beyond the normal rules of compensation and award the plaintiff punitive
damages in addition thereto. 52
47 36 Cal.App. 604, 173 P. 494 (1918).
48 35 Ill.App.2d 54, 181 N.E.2d 616 (1962).
49 Ross v. Kohler, 163 Ky. 583, 174 S.W. 36 (1915).
50 Worden v. Davis, 195 N.Y. 391, 88 N.E. 745 (1909).
51 Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. and Navy Co., 78 Oreg. 355, 153 P. 470 (1915);
Beckwith v. Bean, supra n. 12.
52 Sternberg v. Hogg, 254 Ky. 761, 72 S.W.2d 421 (1934).
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Conclusion
At least one respected scholar, Judge Mathes, has flatly argued that
policemen should be immunized against personal liability for acts done
during the course of their employment. 53 In addition, a current of sym-
pathy for the police has begun to run through law-abiding segments of
all communities in grateful recognition of the dangers and pressures to
which these men daily expose themselves. At any or every minute of an
eight-hour shift the patrolman may be threatened with the loss of his life,
or he may be called upon to prevent death or injury to a victimized citi-
zen. Death may be stalking him around any corner. Under such stress
requiring split-second judgment, should we leave hanging over him the
impending threat of an action for damages in the event he is mistaken?
Whatever the answer, it is a problem for the legislature since the
common law quite clearly affixes liability upon policemen in those situ-
ations described above. However, if the winds of change blow through
the timber of judicial decisions, it is urged that the tendency to amelio-
rate the plight of the police should be extended. The exigency of the
moment may compel an officer to use measures which may seem, in the
calm of reflective hindsight, to be extreme. But he does not have the
benefit of calm deliberation, and he should be held to a standard of con-
duct commensurate with the circumstances which he faces. That is the
very least the law owes its own enforcement officers.
53 53 Geo. L. J. 889 (1965).
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